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ABSTRACT: This paper argues that Turkey’s contemporary role in the Caspian Sea region directly challenges Samuel
P. Huntington’s civilizational paradigm. While his work Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996)
is now a rather dated contribution to International Relations Theory, Huntington’s ideas have continued to reverberate
in the post-9/11 world. As the conflict between the US and the Islamic world drags on in Iraq and the Middle East,
the allure of Huntingtonesque arguments may be all the stronger.
The civilization that most conforms to Huntington’s paradigm is the Islamic civilization. Within the geographical area
of this civilization, the Caspian Sea presents an ideal region for study. Historically, this region has been an arena for the
struggles of major global powers. In the nineteenth century, this pattern of conflict was dubbed The Great Game.
Russia, China, and the US constitute the global powers now engaged in this pattern of competition. Therefore, the
region provides possible support for those who endorse a clash of civilizations paradigm.
However, analysis of Turkey’s interaction in this region undermines this case. Turkey is an historically integral part of
the Islamic world and cannot easily be dismissed by Huntington as an anomaly. This paper employs historical event
data analysis across global, regional, and state levels. The conclusion of this research is that Turkey’s international
relationships do not reflect a growing trend toward a clash of civilizations. This examination, then, may be a timely
reminder that the civilizational approach lacks utility in International Relations Theory.
Republication not permitted without written consent of the author.
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INTRODUCTION
In the post 9/11 world, questions linger about the
conflict between the United States, Islamic countries,
and extremists. One popular explanation of this conflict
is Samuel P. Huntington’s “clashing civilizations.”
While Huntington’s book Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order (1996) is now a rather dated
contribution to International Relations Theory, the allure
of his arguments is still strong. Even the US congress has
entertained his ideas. On September 14, 2006, the House
of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East
and Central Asia held a hearing entitled, “Is there a clash
of civilizations?: Islam, democracy, and U.S.-Middle East
and Central Asia Policy.” 1
The Islamic civilization appears at the center of debates
over the clash of civilizations. Within the geographical
bounds of the Islamic civilization, the Caspian Sea
area presents an ideal region for study. The Caspian is
the largest inland body of water in the world, bordering
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran.
Historically, this region has hosted the struggles of major
global powers. In the nineteenth century, this pattern of
conflict came to be known as The Great Game. Today,
Russia, China, and the US are the powers competing
for regional influence. Therefore, Caspian Sea history
possibly provides support for a clash of civilizations
paradigm.
However, within the region lies the secular Republic of
Turkey. The intimate ties between Turkey and Western
states do not conform to Huntington’s paradigm.
Historically an essential part of the Islamic civilization,
Turkey also cannot easily be dismissed as an anomaly.

considering the dominant religious background of each.2
In Restructuring of World Peace: On the Threshold of the
Twenty-First Century, Johan Galtung develops a theory
similar to Clash of Civilizations.3 Published also in the
same year, was Joel Kotkin’s Tribes. Kotkin also attempts
to divide the world into civilizational groupings, which
he calls “tribes.” 4
Civilization as a Concept
Scholars who have found Huntington’s proposal valid
appear to be few in number. After Foreign Affairs
published Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” one of
the first scholars to respond was Albert Weeks. Weeks
dismissed the utility of civilizations as a useful concept,
citing the Persian Gulf War. In that conflict, ArabMuslim states allied against each other with states from
other civilizations. Weeks’s argument suggested that
the states of the Islamic civilization did not behave in
a similar enough manner for Huntington’s theory to
possess any descriptive or predictive utility (an argument
to which this paper contributes). 5
Other scholars have noted the difficulty of defining
civilizations. 6 If any of Huntington’s religiously defined
civilizations conform to his assumptions, however, it
would be the Islamic civilization. Jonathan Fox develops
this argument in “Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict:
Islam and the West.”He too notes the difficulty of defining
civilizations and attempts to supplement Huntington’s
broad demarcations with ethnic considerations. 7

The purpose of this paper is to challenge Huntingtonesque
explanations of foreign affairs. The hypothesis is that
Turkey’s foreign relations with the global powers (Russia,
China, and the US) and the states of the Caspian Sea
region (Iran, Caucasus, and Central Asia), cannot be
explained by Huntington. To evaluate Huntington’s
theory, this research paper will employ historical event
data analysis at the global and regional levels.

Salience of the Islamic Civilization
In general, Fox’s quantitative examination of ethnic
conflict does not support Huntington. However, Fox’s
examination does provide a basis for explaining why
Huntingtonesque ideas might ring true in the Western
mind. First, Fox notes a slight increase in post-Cold
War conflicts between Islamic groups and the West.
Second, the majority of all inter-civilizational ethnic
conflicts involve Islamic groups. Third, the majority of
ethnic conflicts which involve Islamic groups are intercivilizational conflicts. 8 Therefore, the Islamic civilization
appears to provide salient support for Huntington.

BACKGROUND
Huntington's Argument
Huntington argues that contemporary international
relations are best understood through a civilizational
approach. He posits that conflict between civilizations will
drive the conflicts of modern states. His approach requires
grouping the world’s states into several civilizations,

The Caspian Region, The Great Game,
& Global Competition
Within the geographic area of Huntington’s Islamic
civilization lies the Caspian Sea region. Literature on
this region’s history reveals that global powers have
consistently competed for power and influence in the
region since the era of The Great Game. The Great
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Game refers to nineteenth century competition between
the British, Tsarist, and Ottoman empires. Some credit
the term to Arthur Conolly but it was popularized by
Kipling.

has written on Russia’s role in the Great Game.18 Once
again these powers fit into Huntington’s divisions of
civilizations, reinforcing the Caspian’s relevance to this
paper’s research.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the British Empire
expanded northward through India, while the Tsarist
Russian Empire moved southward into Central Asia,
converging on the borders of the Ottoman Empire. After
Britain made several unsuccessful attempts to subdue
Afghanistan, The Great Game was eventually forgotten
as the world entered World War II.9 Following World
War II, the world saw the Cold War development of
a bi-polar balance of power between the Soviet Union
(USSR) and the US. Of the Caspian Sea region, Maggie
Gallagher noted that the Cold War standoff assumed
characteristics of The Great Game.10 Afghanistan found
itself threatened again when it was invaded by the Soviets
in late 1979. With Pakistani and American support, the
invasion was repulsed. The USSR began to disintegrate
soon after.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role
The Republic of Turkey is a major state in the Caspian
Sea region. It straddles the Sea of Marmara, bridges
Europe and the Middle East, and controls access between
the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Further, it sits directly
adjacent to Iran and has a population of more than 70
million. Huntington notes Turkey’s importance himself,
arguing that it is the state best prepared, militarily and
economically, to lead the Islamic civilization.19

Today, the geopolitical vacuum left by the USSR has
begun to dissipate as Russia, China, and the US approach
new levels of engagement in the region. The two primary
motivations driving these states to greater involvement
are their respective energy and security interests.
Energy interests. Caspian oil production accounts for
2.8 percent of the world’s oil supply, while gas production
accounts for 5 percent.11 Russia controls the majority of
Caspian energy transportation routes.12 Russia and the
US have begun to compete for control of these routes
in a manner that has been characterized as a zero-sum
game concerned with relative gains.13 China has also
been compelled to join the energy competition due to
soaring energy requirements.14
Security interests. All three powers have security
interests in the region. Russian concerns include conflicts
in Chechnya and Abkhazia.15 China is concerned with
the stability of its Xingjian province, undermined by
Islamic movements.16 US security interest is a direct
result of 9/11. In response, the US has established several
military bases in the region as it pursues the War on
Terror.
Thus, it can be argued that the era of a New Great Game
has arrived (a term coined by Ahmed Rashid).17 This
perspective has been advocated not only by Western
scholars but by scholars such as Vladimir Radyuhin, who
Published by STARS, 2006

However, Turkey also challenges Huntington’s theory.
With a predominantly Sunni Muslim population but a
secular government, Turkey is unique from most other
states in Huntington’s Islamic civilization. In spite of
his praise for Turkey, Huntington argues that Turkey’s
secular-Western bent will prohibit it from assuming the
lead of its civilization. He characterizes Turkey as a “torn
country,” a special theoretical category he has created.
Huntington defines torn countries as those that belong
to one civilization but whose leaders desire to adopt
another. Turkey’s secular government, Western allies, and
its attempts to join the EU all bolster Huntington’s case. 20
Therefore, it is vital to analyze Turkey. Either the Turkish
case serves to demonstrate Huntington’s assumptions, or
reveals shortcomings in his theory that he disguises in a
superfluous theoretical category.
Turkey has long been an integral part of the Islamic
civilization. During The Great Game, Turkey was the
heart of the Ottoman Empire. Erik-Jan Zurcher argues
that Turkey is the direct heir of this empire, receiving
its dominant ethnic and cultural elements, as well as
its cultural and administrative centers. 21 If Turkey can
“westernize” despite such ties to its civilization, then
what worth is civilizational identity in determining state
behavior?
GLOBAL COMPETITION
To place Turkey’s relations with Russia, China, and the
US in perspective, a brief analysis of the New Great
Game is necessary, as is a summary of the post-Cold
War history of each power. An in-depth examination of
each power after 2000 is provided to complete analysis of
today’s global competition.
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Russia
Russia has the longest history of involvement in the
Caspian Sea region. It has had vested regional interests
since The Great Game. Even after the collapse of the
USSR, Russia did not, nor has it yet, ever completely lost
its stake in the region. Control in the Caspian is not just
an issue of regional security, or the energy market, but
one of pride.22
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end
of the Cold War. As the USSR disintegrated, Soviet
treaties came into question. To ensure the stability of
the Caspian region, the Minsk Agreement was signed
on December 21, 1991. The Russian Federation and the
former Soviet republics of the region agreed to guarantee
all treaties signed with the former USSR. Iranian and
Soviet agreements regarding control of the Caspian
Sea, however, were invalidated. The fledgling states of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan wanted to
share the sea’s resources.
In 1994, Kazakhstan drafted a proposal on the legal status
of the Caspian Sea, prompting other states to advocate
their own interpretations. Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Turkmenistan signed the Ashgabat Declaration two
years later. This agreement laid out a plan for the division
of the Caspian, and Azerbaijan was in danger of being
locked out of negotiations. In 1997, oil disputes broke
out between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. Russia
intervened and, as a result, Azerbaijan began working
bilaterally with Russia to officially settle these disputes.
In April 1998, both states also established a formal
agreement to divide the seabed on their coasts.
Following 9/11, Russia cooperated with the new US
military presence in the region. Both states share an
interest in combating terrorism. However, Russia
is concerned with the length of the US presence.23
Increased US involvement has changed the military
power balance in the region. Previously, Russia and
China were providing security through entities such as
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Now,
Russia is working to reinvigorate these regional security
structures. In 2002, Russia formed the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSO) with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Armenia. 24
Russia also has an economic interest in the Caspian
region. One of the greatest issues is the rancorous debate
over the division of the Caspian Sea. Russia has labored to
develop an agreement that would be mutually beneficial
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/4

for all the littoral states while maintaining Russian
hegemony. 25 In sum, Russia is working to prevent its role
as a regional hegemon from being undermined militarily
or economically. Indeed, economic advantages appear
just as essential to Russia as military dominance.
China
China’s entry into The New Great Game indicates that
it can no longer be considered just an East-Asian power.
It has established trade missions in every Central Asian
state and begun to enter the Caspian oil industry.26
China has turned its Xinjiang province into an economic
hub. This region shares its border with Mongolia,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and India. 27 Demographically, China’s presence
is being felt as well, with more than 100,000 Chinese
now living in Kazakhstan.28
As China engages this region, it has an interest in
balancing the influence of the US and Russia. US bases
in Central Asia place US military forces uncomfortably
close to China’s western border. China, Russia, and the
other members of the SCO have called for the United
States to set a deadline to withdraw from military bases in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. While Russian and Chinese
relations have been relatively cooperative since 2000, it
would be a mistake to forget that they are competing for
oil. Cooperation on security issues may prove secondary
to China’s demand for oil (particularly if the US threat
fades). Economic growth in China has fueled voracious
consumption of energy. The growing demand for oil
is probably one of the most important factors driving
Chinese foreign policy in the region. 29
United States
The US has a unique position in the New Great Game,
as a power half-way around the globe. After the demise
of the USSR, the US began to engage the region.
The US provided approximately 1.9 billion dollars to
Caspian states between 1992 and 1999. By 1994, the
Clinton administration had established an agency
devoted to Caspian policy. In 1998, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright traveled to the region. Also in that
year, President Clinton appointed a special advisor for
Caspian affairs. 30
The region’s oil supplies are one of the United States’
leading interests but should not be considered a lone
driver of US policy. Currently, the Bush administration
appears to place counter-terrorism above economic
priorities. Strong US financial and military involvement
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quickly followed 9/11, including the establishment of
the military bases that have concerned China. As a result
of its financial and military commitment, the US has
become a major player in the Caspian. However, because
the US lacks geographical proximity, Russia and China
may ultimately have more regional influence.
While US aid is attractive to Caspian states, the US
presence can be uncomfortable. A commitment to
unilateralism is one cause for unease. US normative goals
have also unsettled the region’s authoritarian leaders,
who feel endangered by US promotion of democracy.
Uzbekistan illustrates this point. Uzbekistan was a
significant recipient of new US aid, but turned toward
Russia and China as the West criticized its human
rights violations. Still, the US has experienced successes
beyond the military realm. In December of 2006, the
new US-supported South Caucasus pipeline began
carrying natural gas to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey
(bypassing Russia). This pipeline is planned to extend to
Europe, limiting Russian and Iranian control of Caspian
oil. 31
TURKEY IN THE REGION
With an overview of competition at the global level
complete, attention will now be focused on the regional
level. A brief history of the Republic of Turkey will be
followed by a discussion of Turkish foreign relations
with (a) the three global powers, (b) the Caucasus states,
(c) the Central Asian states, and (d) the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Utilizing qualitative analysis of Turkey’s foreign
relations since 2000, this paper’s hypothesis will be tested
against the historical trends in Turkey’s relationships.
Republic of Turkey
The Republic of Turkey was declared in 1923, after
Mustafa Kemal Pasha led the War of Independence.
Under Kemal, Turkey began pursuing modernization and
westernization by secularizing its government. Kemal’s
Republican People’s Party introduced sweeping changes
in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1926, the Turkish parliament
repealed Islamic Holy Law, and the Romanized alphabet
was adopted two years later. A second round of reforms
followed in the 1930s. In 1934, women were granted
suffrage. During that era, the Turkish state required that
all citizens register family names. It was at this time that
Kemal had the family name Ataturk (“Father Turk”)
granted to him.
Since Kemal, the Republic of Turkey has experienced
periods of turmoil but remained committed to secular,
Published by STARS, 2006

modern government. In 1960, junior Turkish officers
staged a military coup, ushering in the Second Republic.
A new constitution established a bicameral legislature
and a Constitutional Court. Then in 1980, the Turkish
military again seized control of the government. Two
years later, a national referendum was held on another
constitution and the Third Republic officially began.
The Turkish military has maintained its determination
to protect Turkey’s secular government, as evidenced
when Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to continue
limitations on Islam in public life in 1997.
The beginning of Turkey’s modern relationship with
the West can be traced to World War II. Just before
the war concluded, Turkey officially entered the conflict
on the side of the Allies in order to receive a place in
the new United Nations. During the Cold War, Turkey
maintained its Western alliances, joining NATO in 1952.
By 1959, Turkey had applied for associate membership in
the European Economic Community. During the 1960s,
however, the Cyprus Crisis began to simmer. In 1974,
Turkey launched an invasion of Cyprus, damaging its
relationship with the US and Europe. The US cut aid to
Turkey, and Turkey retaliated by closing US bases. It was
not until July of 1978 that these actions were rescinded.
Turkey’s attempts to become economically integrated
with Europe appear to have hit a wall. In 1978, Turkey’s
application for membership in the European Economic
Community was refused due to the state’s lack of political
freedom. In 1997, Turkey found itself snubbed again
when the EU rejected Turkey’s bid for membership. This
stunned Turkey, which had held associate membership
since 1964. It wasn’t until 1999 that the EU readmitted
Turkey as a candidate.
However, with the US, Turkey found a significant ally.
Relations recovered from the Cyprus Crisis and, during
the Kuwait Crisis and the Persian Gulf War, Turkey
served as a critical partner in the coalition against Iraq.
Considering this reconciliation, the positive US-Turkey
Cold War relationship, the negative Russia-Turkey Cold
War relationship, and Turkey’s weaker ties with China
(which will be examined later), it was safe to say that
Turkey’s strongest relationship with a global power was
with the United States.
Turkey and the United States
The degree of cooperation between Ankara and
Washington has been an example of the positive
relations that can occur between diverse civilizations.
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However, since 2000, there has been new tension in
this relationship. The following analysis will attempt to
determine if this tension could be indicative of a growing
trend toward civilizational conflict or if it is merely one
of the up and downs that has historically occurred in
Turkey’s relationship with the West.

that its Kurdish population will try to gain independence.
To prevent the Kurdish issue from weakening the
relationship, the US Ambassador to Turkey agreed to
join the fight against members of the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (a Kurdish terrorist organization committed to the
creation of an independent Kurdistan).40

In 2000, the US Congress considered a bill declaring that
the Ottoman Empire had committed genocide against
the Armenian people. This raised a negative response
from Turkey. Sharper disagreement followed with the
war in Iraq. As early as December 2, 2002, the US was
pressuring Turkey for assistance. Reluctant, Turkey
requested promises of significant economic aid and US
support for its EU candidacy. 32 Later, it was reported that
Turkey had again not been accepted for EU membership.
Some EU officials even disclosed that US support had
actually negatively impacted Turkey’s application. 33 The
negativity of association with the US provides reason for
the Turks to be cautious. While Turkey was negotiating
with the US over Iraq, the Turkish Prime Minister
was trying to repair Turkey’s image with its neighbors
by visiting Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Arab League
members.34

In the realm of economics as well, some tension has
emerged as Turkey has begun to expand its dealings
with Iran. In August of 2000, Turkey signed a deal to
import Iranian natural gas in spite of US protests.41
Still, economic ties between the US and Turkey have
continued. On November 28, 2000, Turkey signed a
$1.5 billion contract with Boeing. 42 On April 18, 2001,
President Bush made it clear that the US would continue
supporting Turkey’s economic reforms.43 In 2002, the US
hosted the Turkish Prime Minister as Turkey pursued
loans from the International Monetary Fund. 44 By 2005,
the US was praising the development of the Turkish
economy. 45

Despite these tensions, the US has continued to express
how valuable Turkey is as an ally. In 2003, President
Bush praised Turkey for its commitment to secular
governance.35 The Turkish Foreign Minister reciprocated,
expressing desire for reconciliation. In 2005, President
Bush and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan held a
meeting to redefine and repair the relationship – a
relationship the US has qualified as vital.36 The Turkish
Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State then
met on July 5th and announced a “shared vision” on a
number of international issues.37 Since then, another
genocide bill in the US Congress has stirred tensions, but
neither side appears to see any end to a close diplomatic
relationship.
Though the Iraq war may have strained relations,
cooperation on military and security issues has persisted
over the past six years. In 2000, the Turkish government
allowed US aircraft to extend their use of Turkish bases.
38
In November of 2001, Turkey (the only Muslim state
in NATO) announced it would send forces to join the
US-led invasion of Afghanistan. US officials placed
Turkey at the head of a multinational force consisting
of Muslim troops. Since 2004, Turkey has been allowing
the US to use an airbase in the south.39 The creation of
Kurdistan in northern Iraq has exacerbated Turkey’s fears
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/4

Turkey and Russia
Historically, Russia and Turkey have had antagonistic ties
which date back to the nineteenth century when Tsarist
Russia and the Ottoman Empire were engaged in The
Great Game. Competition between the two countries
emerged again in the Cold War era when Turkey allied
itself with the West against the aggression of the USSR.
Today the barriers to a closer Turkey-Russia relationship
may be disappearing.
In 2001, Russia and Turkey signed “Eurasian Partnership
Blueprints” affirming state sovereignty and a commitment
to the UN and other international organizations. 46 After
9/11, Russia and Turkey realized a shared concern for
terrorism as they cooperated with the US-led War on
Terror. On Iraq, however, both opposed a US invasion.
These agreements may have played a role in Russian
President Putin’s visit to Ankara in 2004 (the first visit by
a Russian president). The Turkish Prime Minister soon
visited Russia in turn. Regarding Iran and its nuclear
program, Turkey has also exhibited willingness to
collaborate with Russia. Both states argue that isolating
Iran might foster conflict that will damage regional trade
and stir chaos in the Middle East.
Still, relations remain touchy on security issues. Armenia
and Turkey have hostile relations and, thus, Turkey has
found Russia’s military support of that state troubling.
Russia, anxious to regain control of Chechnya has
suspected Turkish support for Chechen fighters. In
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November 2001, Russia and Turkey began to address their
differences when they signed a plan for enhanced bilateral
cooperation (including efforts to fight terrorism). 47 Two
months later, both signed a framework of agreements for
cooperation and training also designed to relieve these
concerns.48 Russia has also courted Turkey as a potential
arms consumer. In 2005, Turkey was reported to be
constructing new antiaircraft complexes with Russia.49
Perhaps the greatest remaining security related barrier
between the two is Turkey’s status as a NATO member.
Since the collapse of the USSR, Turkey and Russia have
been developing closer economic ties. One of the best
examples is the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline.
In 2000, the Turkish Minister of Energy announced
that Russia had gained the lead in the race to deliver
natural gas to Turkey.50 Russia is currently Turkey's top
gas supplier, delivering two-thirds of its imports. Total
bilateral trade in 2004 exceeded 10 billion dollars, making
Russia Turkey's second largest commercial partner after
Germany. In 2007, total bilateral trade reached 25 billion
dollars.51
Turkey and China
Ties between China and Turkey remain friendly but
weak. In April of 2000, Turkey and China signed a joint
communiqué on bilateral ties.52 In 2002, the Chinese
communicated interest in Turkish foreign affairs when it
diplomatically entered the Cyprus controversy. 53 In 2004,
Turkish and Chinese justice ministers dialoged on how to
improve bi-lateral relations, and Turkey reminded China
that it values mutual friendship.54 Both states have also
served as ambassadors to Iran and advocate negotiation
regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
On February 14, 2000, the first bilateral security
cooperation agreement between Turkey and China was
signed. 55 By 2003, China and Turkey met specifically to
discuss cooperation on counterterrorism, and two years
later Turkey indicated plans to work with the Chinese
air force on air defense development.56 Discussions of
military exchanges continued through 2006.57
In 2000, the communiqué on bi-lateral affairs also
signaled growing economic ties. Plans to reinvigorate
the old Silk Road was one example. 58 The following year,
China promised to increase imports from Turkey by ten
times. 59 In 2003, Turkish State Minister Kursad Tuzmen
said that exports to China would increase up to $500
million by the end of the year.60 And in 2006, Turkey
sent a delegation to China to investigate opportunities to
Published by STARS, 2006

increase the penetration of Chinese markets.61
In summary, Turkey appears to desire stable, cooperative
relationships with all three global powers. It also seems to
be achieving these ends. As an Islamic state, however, such
cooperation with powers of three different civilizations
is surprising. In the following investigation of Turkey’s
relations with the Caspian states, the possibility that
Turkey is a “torn country” will be explored.
Turkey and the Caspian States
Now that examination of Turkey’s relationship with the
global powers is complete, it is time to analyze Turkey’s
relationship with other states in the region. Turkish
relations with these so-called Caspian States will be
discussed in three sections: (1) the Caucasus States of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; (2) the Central Asian
States of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan;
and (3) Turkish ties to Iran. Iran is considered separately
because it is a major Caspian state of equal status with
Turkey and because of the contrast that Iranian foreign
relations present.
The Caucasus States
Armenia. In regard to Turkey’s relations with Armenia,
historical enmity has created a nearly insurmountable
wall of tension. This stems from the history of violent
treatment Armenians suffered in the waning days of the
Ottoman Empire. The antagonism between the Christian
Armenians and Muslim Turks could be perceived as a
clash between civilizations.
Some efforts have been made since 2000 to reconcile
these two states. In 2002, Armenia agreed to open
relations with Turkey without preconditions. Turkey
remained aloof, demanding that Armenia halt invasions
into Azerbaijan and drop claims to Turkish territory.62
In 2003, renewed effort emerged as Armenia began
to consider concessions to Turkey.63 Later that year,
Turkey announced it would consider renewing ties with
Armenia.64 When Armenia appeared in 2004 to have
failed to honor the agreed-upon concessions, Turkey
announced that it would again suspend relations. 65 The
fact that the EU has suggested it wants to see resolution
might continue to prompt Turkey to consider renewing
its relations with Armenia. So far, however, progress has
stalled.
Azerbaijan. The relationship between Turkey and
Azerbaijan is quite a contrast to tension with Armenia.
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Although Azerbaijan is primarily populated by Sh’ia
Muslims, and Turkey by Sunni Muslims, both have
had close relations over the past six years. Azerbaijan
has appreciated Turkish support against Armenian
aggression. In 2003, Turkish President Erdogan asserted
his commitment to expanding bi-lateral relations with
Azerbaijan. 66 In 2004, Azerbaijan expressed the feeling
that Turkey is one of the only states that understands its
situation with Armenia. 67
Turkey’s ties to Azerbaijan are also economic. In 2000,
Azerbaijani President Aliyev announced a concession
on tariffs for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. 68 The next year,
Aliyev signed a 15-year deal with Turkish President
Sezer to sell natural gas from the Shah Denis field in
the Caspian Sea. 69 In May of 2005, this new oil pipeline
opened, leading the way for a strong economic link
between these two states.
Georgia. The relationship between Turkey and Georgia,
which has a large Christian population, has been rather
positive as well. On September 30, 2001, Azerbaijan
and Georgia signed an agreement to transport Azeri oil
across Georgian territory and into Turkey. 70 Georgia’s
agreement meant that Turkey could now access
Azerbaijani oil. Since this agreement, Georgia and
Turkey have issued much praise for the success of their
relationship. 71 Since 2000, both militaries have engaged
in joint training. 72 In 2002, the Georgian government
was working with the Turks on mutual security concerns
regarding the Russians and the Caucasus. 73 Just before
the year ended in 2006, Turkey signed an agreement to
supply Georgia with natural gas. 74
The Central Asian States
Kazakhstan. Turkey and Kazakhstan share cordial
relations and, since 2000, these two states have been
hammering out plans on trade. 75 In April, the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium awarded Turkey a $45 million
contract to build a pipeline from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil
field to the Black Sea. 76 In 2001, Turkey donated a Coast
Guard boat for Kazakhstan’s use in the Caspian Sea. At
that time, Turkey was also training Kazakh pilots.77 By
March 4, 2002, Kazakhstan and Turkey could mark
ten years of friendly diplomatic ties. That year, Turkey
granted one million dollars worth of military supplies to
Kazakhstan. 78 These two states also held a joint program
to facilitate cooperation on economic and social issues.79
In 2003, the Turkish military made another grant to
Kazakhstan for of 1.5 million dollars.80 Turkey and
Kazakhstan also signed a Commercial and Economical
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/4

Cooperation Treaty. Another donation of over a million
dollars was made by Turkey to Kazakhstan’s military in
2005.81 By 2007, trade volume between these two states
had exceeded 1.5 billion dollars.82
Turkmenistan. Turkey and Turkmenistan share a close
cultural and ethnic history. Early in 2000, Turkmenistan
and Turkey signed an energy agreement.83 The next year,
it was reported that Turkey had donated a language
lab for Turkmen military students.84 In 2002, as
Turkish military aid continued, ties were described as
“brotherly.”85 Through 2003, Turkish President Erdogan
urged deeper cooperation on energy. 86 On November
25, 2003, however, there was an assassination attempt
on the life of Turkmen President Niyazov. In this plot,
several Turkish citizens were arrested, creating a scandal
that shook diplomatic relations. Since that time, there
has been little to report on Turkish-Turkmen relations,
beyond possible shipments of Turkmen natural gas in a
deal that Iran and Turkey have worked on.
Uzbekistan. Ties between Turkey and Uzbekistan have
been strained in the past. The source of this conflict
originated in 1999, when Uzbekistan accused Turkey
of harboring Islamic extremists who were plotting to
assassinate Uzbek President Karimov. Uzbekistan then
shut down Turkish schools, prompting Turkey to recall
its ambassador. The next year, Turkey reached out for a
diplomatic solution and the Uzbeks reciprocated.87 In
2001, the first Joint Economic Council meeting was held
between Turkey and Uzbekistan. Though delayed due to
diplomatic tensions, this meeting signaled an effort to
resume cooperation. Until this meeting, these two states
had only three agreements on trade.88 By 2003, the Uzbek
Foreign Minister Sadyk Safayev was visiting Ankara to
sign a number of cooperation accords. 89 Cooperation has
continued, and Turkey has waived visa requirements for
limited visits by Uzbek citizens.90
Turkey and Iran
Iran is a major state in Huntington’s Islamic Civilization.
Huntington argues that Iran is a prime example of the
trouble states found in the Islamic civilization, and that the
rivalry between Iran and the US provides a good example
for a clash of civilizations.91 Strategically located between
Central Asia and the Arabian Peninsula, Iran borders the
Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea.
With a population of nearly 70 million people, Iran is
roughly the same size as Turkey. Iran possesses a strong
pre-Islamic culture and Sh’ia Muslim heritage. About
51% of Iranians are Persian and approximately 89% are
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Sh’ia Muslims.
Turkey and Iran have a complicated, often strained,
relationship. Turkey’s alliance with the US is one reason
for this. Turkey also has a secular government, which sets
it apart from Iran and its theocratic Islamic government.
An indicator of the historical separation in this
relationship can be found in the levels of trade between
the two states. Iranian-Turkish bilateral trade stood at
2.3 billion dollars in 1985 but, over the following 15
years, fell to the level of 800 million dollars.92 In 2002,
trade disputes were still very much an issue, and Turkey
suspended Iran's first natural gas exports since the Iranian
revolution. Iran protested, accusing Turkey of backing
out because of the slowing Turkish economy.93 By 2004,
economic ties looked brighter and projections put bilateral trade at 2.4 billion dollars for 2003 (a 90 percent
increase over 2002). At the same time, Turkey and Iran
signed a security agreement concerning Kurdish rebels
and Iranian opposition fighters.94
Still, both sides failed to address a plethora of bitter
trade disputes, and several business deals were cancelled.
International displeasure over Iran’s nuclear program
has also strained Iranian-Turkish relations. When Iran
decided to resume uranium enrichment early in 2006,
Turkey issued a strongly worded statement condemning
the action.95 Turkey also urged Iran to accept an offer by
the US to join European-led talks on Tehran's nuclear
program.96
The final distinction between Iran and Turkey emerges
from Iran’s relationships with Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In fact, Iran’s relationship with the two countries is exactly
the opposite from Turkey’s. While Iran shares a Sh’ia
heritage with Azerbaijan, the two states have disputes
over the division of the Caspian Sea’s oil reserves and
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the US. Scholar Cameron
Brown notes this confliction relationship, when he
explores Iranian-Azeri tension in relation to Azerbaijan’s
disputes with Armenia.97 Relations with Christian
Armenia, on the other hand, have included cooperation
diplomatically, economically, and on security. If Turkey is
a “torn country,” then we should expect it to have friendly
ties with Armenia and tension with Azerbaijan. Instead,
this is the pattern that Iran exhibits.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of Turkey’s global and regional relations is now
complete. At the global level, there is a New Great Game
between the global powers. This Great Game pattern
Published by STARS, 2006

could be construed to fit Huntington’s conception of
clashing civilizations. However, Turkey’s relations with
the global powers suggest that Turkey is not engaged in
any inter-civilizational struggle. Instead, Turkey appears
to desire constructive relationships with all three states.
While new strains in Turkey’s post 9/11 relationship
with the US could be framed as a growing trend toward
civilizational conflict, Turkey’s ties with Russia have been
growing simultaneously. Fox’s observation that a clash of
civilizations is only a Western perspective appears to still
hold true. Huntington’s theory, therefore, would seem to
be undermined.
In light of these findings, those who support
Huntingtonesque arguments must explain the Turkish
exception to the rule. Huntington attempts to do this
by classifying Turkey as a “torn country.” One of the first
objections that can be raised to this argument is that,
if states like Turkey can leave their civilizations behind,
then civilizational factors cannot entirely explain state
behavior. This argument relates directly to Weeks’s
denegration of the utility of the civilization concept.
It is a remarkable challenge for Huntington to explain
how a state like Turkey, historically an integral part of
its civilization, could deviate so widely from the normal
pattern of state behavior assumed in his theory.
From the analysis of Turkey’s relations with Caspian states,
criticism may also be found for Huntington’s “torn state”
category. Turkey’s most positive regional relations are
with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. These states
are remarkably diverse, Azerbaijan possessing a mostly
Sh’ia population, Georgia being primarily Christian,
and Kazakhstan being divided between both Muslims
and Christians. Turkey’s most strained ties are with Iran,
Armenia, and Uzbekistan. In the international system
that Huntington presents, it is remarkable that the most
secular state in the Islamic civilization would have such
dismal relations with a Christian nation like Armenia.
Negative relationships with Christian states, and possibly
even Sh’ia states, is a pattern that Huntington’s theory
would normally predict for a state with a Sunni Muslim
population. The sum of Turkey’s foreign relations with
states in the Caspian Sea region, then, defy explanations
based solely on considerations of civilizational identity.
When Turkey’s relations are compared to Iran’s, this
assertion is only further strengthened. Further historical
analysis of Iran’s foreign relations in the region would be
a valuable place to begin further research.
At both the global and regional levels, then, Turkey’s
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foreign policy decisions do not appear to support
Huntingtonesque assumptions. Such findings restrict the
utility that Huntington’s theory possesses in International
Relations Theory and provide reason to refrain from
assuming a similar approach in the practice of foreign
policy. Indeed, to practice foreign policy informed by
Huntington’s paradigm could create a dangerous selffulfilling prophecy – increasing ethnic and religious
tensions world-wide. Shahram Akbarzadeh specifically
examines the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy if
the West begins to associate terrorism with the beliefs
of Muslim people. 98 Instead, policy makers and scholars
should focus on unearthing more substantial factors
influencing the behavior of states. Turkey’s example
appears to indicate that political, economic, and security
considerations are factors that override the ties a state
might have with its civilization.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/4

www.URJ.ucf.edu

36

10

Burns: Turkey, the Caspian Region, & the Clash of Civilizations
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

2: 27–41

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

REFERENCES
1 US Congress, September 14, 2006, “Is There a Clash
of Civilizations? Islam, Democracy, and U.S.-Middle
East and Central Asia Policy,” 109th Congress, 2nd
session, doc. no. 109–210, http://www.foreignaffairs.
house.gov/archives/109/29882.pdf (accessed December
10, 2007).
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996), 34-39.
3 Johan Galtung, Restructuring of World Peace: On the
Threshold of the Twenty-First Century (Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press, 1992).
4 Joel Kotkin, Tribes (New York: Random House,
1992).

Books, 2005), 1-3.
13 Marcus Menzel, Doomed to Cooperate? (Peter Lang,
2002), 144-115.
14 Vaclav Smil, “China’s Energy and Resource Uses:
Continuity and Change,” The China Quarterly 156,
(Dec. 1998): 935-951.; John Calabrase, “Dragon by
the Tail: China’s Energy Quandary,” The Middle East
Institute, (2007).
15 Kleveman, 46-55.
16 M. Burles, Chinese Policy toward Russia and the
Central Asian Republics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Project Air Force, 1999), 10-11.
17 Kleveman, 267.

5 Albert L. Weeks, “Do Civilizations Hold,” Foreign
Affairs 72, no. 4 (September-October 1993): 1-2, http://
web6.infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed February 20,
2006).
6 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., “Can Civilizations Clash?,”
Proceedings from the American Philosophical Society
143, no. 3 (September 1999): 2, http://www.jstor.org
(accessed February 28, 2006).
7 Jonathan Fox, “Two Civilizations and Ethnic
Conflict: Islam and the West,” Journal of Peace Research
38, no.4 ( July 2001): 460, http://jstor.org (accessed
February 28, 2006).
8 Ibid., 463 and 466.

18 Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russia and The Great Game
in Central Asia,” Hindu (Feb 2, 2006), http://web6.
infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed February 20, 2006).
19 Huntington, 178.
20 Ibid., 138-145 and 178.
21 Touraj Atabaki, ed., The State and the Subaltern:
Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran,
(New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2007), 100.
22 Paul Starobin, “The New Great Game,” National
Journal 31, no. 11 (March 13, 1999), http://web6.
infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed February 20, 2006).

9 Jeffrey Meyers, “The Great Game and the Afghan
Wars,” World and I 17, ( January 2002), http://web6.
infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed February 20, 2006).

23 Lionel Beehner, “The Rise of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization,” Council on Foreign
Relations, ( June 12, 2006) http://www.cfr.org/
publication/10883/ (accessed: July 7, 2007).

10 Maggie Gallagher, “Afghanistan: The Great Game
Revisited,” National Review 40, no.11 ( June 10, 1988),
http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed February
20, 2006).

24 Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and
Security Management in Central Asia,” International
Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004), http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.
com (accessed February 20, 2006).

11 Crandall, Maureen S., Energy, Economics, and Politics
in the Caspian Region (Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2006).

25 Gawdat Bahgat, “Splitting water: The Geopolitics
of Water Resources in the Caspian Sea,” SAIS Review
XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 278, http://web6.
infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed February 26, 2006).

12 Bernard Gelb & Terry Twyman, The Caspian Sea
Region and Energy Resources, (Hauppauge, NY: Novinka
Published by STARS, 2006

26 Subodh Atal,“The New Great Game,” The National

www.URJ.ucf.edu

37

11

The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ), Vol. 2 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 4
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

2: 27–41

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

Interest 81, (Fall 2005), http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.
com (accessed February 26, 2006).

2000, A22, http://proquest.umi.com.ucfproxy.fcla.edu
(accessed October 18, 2006).

27 “China's Xinjiang Becoming ‘Bridgehead’ for
Central Asia Trade,” Asia Africa Intelligence Wire,
September 22, 2005, http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.
com (accessed February 20, 2006).

39 “Turkish Foreign Minister Says No Need for New
Decision on US Use of Airbase,” British Broadcasting
Corporation, January 13, 2004, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed October 18, 2006).

28 Radyuhin.

40 “There is a Handshake Deal Between Turkey and
the US against PKK,” Financial Times, August 21, 2006,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed October 18, 2006).

29 Atal.
30 Gennaday Chufrin, The Security of the Caspian Region
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 137.
31 Isabel Gorst, “Russia bypassed as Caspian natural gas
pipeline comes on stream,” Financial Times, December
14, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February
9, 2007).
32 Karl Vick, “Turkey Names Its Price for Aid Against
Iraq; Support on EU and Economy Sought From US
for Assistance in War Effort,” The Washington Post,
December 11, 2002, A24, http://proquest.umi.com.
ucfproxy.fcla.edu (accessed October 18, 2006).
33 “World-Wide,” Wall Street Journal, December 16,
2002, A1, http://proquest.umi.com.ucfproxy.fcla.edu
(accessed October 18, 2006).
34 “World; In Brief,” The Washington Post, December 29,
2002, A20, http://proquest.umi.com.ucfproxy.fcla.edu
(accessed October 18, 2006).; Leyla Boulton, “Turkey
Seeks to Repair Its Image Among Arab States:,”
Financial Times, January 6, 2003, 6, http://proquest.
umi.com.ucfproxy.fcla.edu (accessed October 18, 2006).
35 “US President Issues Message as Turkish Republic
Celebrates 80th Anniversary,” Info - Prod Research
(Middle East), November 3, 2003, 1, http://proquest.
umi.com.ucfproxy.fcla.edu (accessed October 18, 2006).
36 “US Says Ties with Turkey Vital,” Financial Times,
July 1, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed
October 18, 2006).
37 “Turkey, US Unveil Shared Vision Document,”
Turkish Daily News, July 6, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.
com (accessed October 18, 2006).
38 “World in Brief,” The Washington Post, December 18,
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/4

41 David I. Oyama, “World Watch,” Wall Street Journal,
Aug 3, 2000, A9, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed
October 23, 2006).
42 “Defense: Boeing Set for AWACS Order,” Middle
East Economic Digest, December 8, 2000, 19, http://web.
lexis-nexis.com (accessed October 23, 2006).
43 Michael M. Phillips, “U.S. Is Likely to Support IMF
Aid Plan for Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2001,
A4, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed October 23,
2006).
44 Douglas Frantz, “Turkey's Leader Visits U.S. to Plead
for Urgent Economic Aid,” New York Times, January 14,
2002, A3, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed October
23, 2006).
45 “US Redirects Grant, Praises Turkey,” Turkish Daily
News, March 7, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed October 18, 2006).
46 “Russia-Turkey: Foreign Ministers Sign Eurasian
Partnership Blueprints,” RIA-Novosti, November 16,
2001, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed October 18,
2006).
47 “Russia, Turkey Sign Military Cooperation Accord,”
Agence France Presse, January 15, 2002, http://web.lexisnexis.com (accessed October 18, 2006).
48 Saadet Oruc, “Armenia Wants Diplomatic Relations
with Turkey... but What About Ankara?,” Turkish
Daily News, June 30, 2002, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 18, 2006).
49 “Turkey is Prepared to Cooperate with Russia in
Creating Anti-Aircraft Complexes,” Agency WPS, October
7, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18,
2006).

www.URJ.ucf.edu

38

12

Burns: Turkey, the Caspian Region, & the Clash of Civilizations
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

2: 27–41

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

50 Hugh Pope, “Russia Takes Lead in Race to Supply
Gas to Turkey --- BP Amoco Plan Also Challenges
U.S.-Backed Bid,” Wall Street Journal, February 17,
2000, A12, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18,
2006).
51 “Doubts About US Seen Bringing Turkey, Russia
Together.”
52 “China, Turkey sign joint communiqué on bilateral
ties,” British Broadcasting Corporation, April 21, 2000,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
53 “Turkey: Minister says China Supports Cyprus
Solution Acceptable to Both Sides,” British Broadcasting
Corporation, July 29, 2002, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 18, 2006).
54 “Justice Ministers of Turkey, China Discuss
Improving Ties,” Financial Times, June 3, 2004, http://
web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).; “Turkish
President Tells Chinese Official Turkey Values Ties
with China,” Financial Times, October 17, 2005, http://
web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
55 “Turkey, China Sign Security Cooperation
Agreement,” British Broadcasting Corporation, February
17, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18,
2006).
56 “China’s Hu Jintao, Turkey’s Ruling Party Chief
Discuss Ties, Counter-Terrorism,” Financial Times,
January 15, 2003, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed
July 18, 2006).; “Turkey, China Eager for Military
Cooperation,” Financial Times, April 5, 2005, http://
web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
57 “China, Turkey Vow to Further Military Exchanges,”
Xinhua General News Service, July 12, 2006, http://web.
lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
58 “China, Turkey sign joint communiqué on bilateral
ties,” British Broadcasting Corporation, April 21, 2000,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
59 “China and Turkey sign ‘Action Plan’ to Boost Ties,”
Agence France Presse, January 8, 2001, http://web.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
60 “Turkey's Tuzmen says Exports to China to Rise
Published by STARS, 2006

to $500 Million in 2003,” Financial Times, August 27,
2003, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18,
2006).
61 “Turkish Business Delegation to Visit China,”
Financial Times, September 15, 2006, http://web.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
62 Oruc.
63 Ugur Ergan, “New Approach Reported in Relations
Between Turkey, Armenia,” Financial Times, June 6,
2003, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18,
2006).
64 “Turkey to Restore Relations with Armenia,
Armenian TV Says,” Financial Times, June 6, 2003,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
65 “Development of Armenia-Turkey Relations
Suspended,” Arminfo News Agency, May 31, 2004,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 18, 2006).
66 “Turkey to Intensify Relations with Azerbaijan –
Erdogan,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, January 7, 2003,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).
67 “Azerbaijan FM: Problem with Opening of
Boundary Connected Not Only with ArmenianAzerbaijani Conflict, but also with Relations Between
Turkey and Armenia,” Arminfo News Agency, May 31,
2004, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21,
2006).
68 Hugh Pope, “Outline Tariff Accord Advances U.S.Backed Oil Pipeline Project,” Wall Street Journal, March
24, 2000, A17, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July
21, 2006).
69 Jeanne Moore, “World Briefing,” New York Times,
March 13, 2001, A9, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 21, 2006).
70 “Gas Pipeline Deal Agreed,” Financial Times,
October 1, 2001, 01, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 21, 2006).
71 “Turkey-Georgia Relations an Example to Follow –
Necdet,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, November 9, 2001,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

www.URJ.ucf.edu

39

13

The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ), Vol. 2 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 4
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

2: 27–41

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

72 “Turkey, Georgia, Improve Military Relations,”
Financial Times, June 26, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.
com (accessed July 21, 2006).

83 David Stern, “Pact on Sharing Pipeline,” Financial
Times, March 13, 2000, 11, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 21, 2006).

73 “Georgia Asks for Turkey’s Support in Relations
with Russia,” British Broadcasting Corporation, February
27, 2002, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21,
2006).

84 “Turkey’s General Staff Donates Language Lab
for Military Students in Turkmenistan,” British
Broadcasting Corporation, February 10, 2001, http://web.
lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

74 “Official: Georgia, Turkey Agree on Gas,” AFX News
Limited, December 24, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed February 9, 2007).

85 “Turkey, Turkmenistan Sign Military Cooperation
Deal,” Turkish Daily News, March 13, 2002, http://web.
lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

75 “CEM: Turkey and Kazakhstan Seeking Ways to
Transport Kazakh Oil Via Baku-Ceyhan,” Financial
Times, June 13, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 21, 2006).

86 “Turkey's Erdogan Seeks to Bolster Energy Ties
with Turkmenistan,” Agence France Presse, January 9,
2003, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21,
2006).

76 “Caspian Pipeline Clears Last Contract Hurdle,”
Middle East Economic, April 7, 2000, 19, http://web.
lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

87 “Turkey, Uzbekistan Mend Fences After Years of
Chill,” Agence France Presse, October 28, 2003, http://
web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

77 “Turkish-Kazakh Military Relations on Track:
Turkey to Donate Coast Guard Boat to Kazakhstan,”
Financial Times, June 22, 2001, http://web.lexis-nexis.
com (accessed July 21, 2006).

88 “Turkey and Uzbekistan to Discuss Trade: The Joint
Economic Council Will Meet for the First Time on
April 18,” Turkish Daily News, April 17, 2001, http://
web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

78 “Turkey to Grant $ 1 MLN of Military Equipment
to Kazakhstan,” Turkish Daily News, March 16, 2002,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21, 2006).

89 “Turkey, Uzbekistan Mend Fences After Years of
Chill.”

79 “Turkey, Kazakhstan Planning Organization
to Strengthen Cooperation,” British Broadcasting
Corporation, May 9, 2002, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed July 21, 2006).
80 “Turkey to Give 1.5M-Dollar Military Aid to
Kazakhstan in 2003,” British Broadcasting Corporation,
May 23, 2003, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July
21, 2006).
81 “Turkey Donates Military Equipment to
Kazakhstan,” British Broadcasting Corporation, June
10, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed July 21,
2006).
82 “Turkish, Kazakh Foreign Ministers Discuss Energy
Cooperation,” British Broadcasting Corporation, April
5, 2007, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed April 5,
2007).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/4

90 “Turkey Exempts Five Central Asian States from
Visa Requirement,” British Broadcasting Corporation,
July 29, 2007, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed
December 13, 2007).
91 Huntington, 178.
92 “Official Stresses Need for Improvement of IranTurkey Relations,” Info-Prod Research (Middle East)
Ltd., May 31, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed June 30, 2006).
93 Leyla Boulton and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Iran
blames Turkey for Gas Dispute,” Financial Times,
September 11, 2002, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed June 30, 2006).
94 “Iran, Turkey Ink Security Accord but Fail to
Resolve Trade Disputes,” Agence France Presse, July 29,
2004, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed June 30,
2006).

www.URJ.ucf.edu

40

14

Burns: Turkey, the Caspian Region, & the Clash of Civilizations
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

2: 27–41

95 “Washington Wants Turkey in Line with Global
Pressure on Iran,” Financial Times Information, February
18, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed June 30,
2006).
96 “Turkey Calls on Iran to Accept US offer,” Agence
France Presse, June 1, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com
(accessed June 30, 2006).
97 Cameron S. Brown, “Wanting to Have Their Cake
and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani Attitudes toward
Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan,” Middle East Journal
58, no. 4, (Autumn 2004), http://find.galegroup.com/
itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF (accessed December 13,
2007).
98 Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Fighting for Civilisation,”
Meanjin 65, 4 (December 2006). http://find.galegroup.
com/itx/start.do?prodId=AONE (accessed December
13, 2007).\

Published by STARS, 2006

www.URJ.ucf.edu

41

15

